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 ADR That is Out of This World: 
A Regime for the Resolution of Outer-
Space Disputes 
GEORGE KHOUKAZ* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Gone are the days when we perceived outer-space exploration as a science-
fiction movie.  In 2004, President George W. Bush announced ambitious goals in 
the pursuit of space exploration.1  The goals included returning to the moon by 2020, 
using the moon as a launch point for future exploratory missions, in addition to 
sending humans (and a number of different explorative equipment) to Mars.2  To 
put it in simple terms, Bush’s plan aimed at “boggl[ing] the imagination” and 
“test[ing] our limits to dream.”3  Space exploration is obviously not a new endeavor; 
however, Bush’s speech revived a movement of increased space explorations.  It is 
now part of an expansive foreign policy strategy that involves having American 
power on a “broad geographical canvas from the Middle-East to outer space.”4  The 
United States’ interest in enlarging and increasing its presence in outer space is an 
extension of its current geographically extensive military presence around the 
globe.5  These outer-space exploratory goals are compared to the expansionist aspi-
rations of ocean-born European empires of the 17th and 18th centuries;6 and therefore 
project a future where nations will compete over space-control to gain a geostrategic 
advantage on Earth. 
A.  A Brief Historical Background 
The military-inspired space race is not a new phenomenon; it is the hallmark 
of the Cold-War era.  After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet 
Union emerged as the sole superpowers and each became increasingly more suspi-
cious of each other’s activities.7  The Soviets refused the “Open Skies” proposal, 
which would have allowed each nation to fly reconnaissance aircrafts over the 
                                                          
* B.A., University of Balamand, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2018. I 
would like to thank my fellow colleagues on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Dispute Resolution, 
as well as Professor Robert Bailey for his insightful recommendations and comments. 
 1.  Office of the Press Sec’y, President Bush Announces New Vision for Space Exploration Program, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 14, 2004), https://history.nasa.gov/Bush%20SEP.htm. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. New Age of Exploration, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Mar. 4, 2004), http://www.washington-
times.com/news/2004/ mar/4/20040304-082405-1445r/.. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Rima Chaddha, Space Race Time Line, PUB. BROAD. SERV. NOVA (Nov. 6, 2007), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/astrospies/time-nf. html. 
1
Khoukaz: ADR That is Out of This World: A Regime for the Resolution of Out
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
266 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2018 
other.8  As a result, President Eisenhower announced the United States’ plan to 
launch a satellite into space in 1955.9  The Soviets reciprocated by announcing they 
would work on achieving the same goal.10  The space race was triggered and a gen-
eral public fear started to build.  Whichever power reached space first would claim 
it for itself while excluding the other, leading to a military confrontation.11 
This Comment is influenced not only by the military’s exploration of outer 
space, but also by a much more recent and interesting development: the increased 
role of private entities in space exploration and space-related activities.  In June 
2004, “SpaceShipOne became the first private-venture craft to leave the earth’s at-
mosphere and enter space.”12  Less than a decade later, in October 2012, another 
private company launched the first commercial flight to the International Space Sta-
tion (ISS).13  Since then, SpaceX has launched at least six other missions into the 
ISS and has recently started the process of using cost-effective, reusable rockets for 
private space missions.14 
As of 2013, the “global space economy” was valued at $314.17 billion.15  In-
terestingly, the private sector accounted for the 76% lion-share of all space-related 
expenses, while government expenditures were limited to the remaining 24% of the 
global space economy.16  Unlike State-sponsored missions, privately-funded space 
activities have a much broader scope, resulting in significantly more complicated 
legal consequences.  For example, a number of companies are developing the re-
quired technology to mine asteroids in outer space for their precious metals such as 
gold.17  Other companies are looking at outer space from a different perspective: 
they are working to send interested wealthy people to outer space as tourists.18  Vir-
gin Galactic, for instance, claims to have more than 500 to-be space-farers presently 
signed up for its space tourism ventures, including celebrities like Tom Hanks and 
Angelina Jolie.19 
                                                          
 8. Caroline Arbaugh, Gravitating Toward Sensible Resolutions: The PCA Optional Rules for the 
Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activity, 42 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 825, 827 (2014). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Space Law in the 21st Century: Some Thoughts in Response to the Bush 
Administration’s Space Initiative, 69 J. AIR. L. & COM. 413, 414 (2004). 
 12. Ka Fei Wong, Collaboration in the Exploration of Outer Space: Using ADR to Resolve Conflicts 
in Space, 7 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 445, 446 (2006). 
 13. First Official Commercial Cargo Flight Heading to International Space Station, CNN (October 
8, 2012, 2:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/07/us/spacex-launch/index.html?hpt=hp_t1. 
 14. Stephen Clark, SES 10 Telecom Satellite in Florida for Launch on Reused SpaceX Rocket, 
SPACEFLIGHT NOW (January 17, 2017), https://spaceflightnow.com/2017/01/17/ses-10-telecom-satel-
lite-in-florida-for-launch-on-reused-spacex-rocket/. 
 15. Marcia S. Smith, Space Foundation: Space Economy Grew by 4 Percent in 2013, SPACE POLICY 
ONLINE (May 19, 2014, 9:36 PM), http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/space-foundation-space-
economy-grew-by-4-percent-in-2013. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Charles Arthur, Google Pair Back Plan to Lasso Asteroids and Mine them for Precious Metals, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2012, 2:21 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/ apr/24/mining-
asteroids-on-moon-precious-metals?INTCMP=SRCH. 
 18. Mike Wall, Next Giant Leap for Space Tourism: A Trip Around the Moon, SPACE.COM (Apr. 28, 
2011), http://www.space.com/11502-space-tourism-moon-mission-space-adventures.html. 
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B.  Purpose and Outline 
The purpose of this Comment is to project into the future by addressing the 
resolution of disputes caused by private entities in outer-space.  This author is well-
aware that such a projection seems improbable today and sounds like a science fic-
tion story.  However, it should be noted that almost sixty years ago, reaching the 
moon was a matter of imagination, while today it is a reality.  The point is that 
technology is evolving so quickly that outer-space disputes will become reality 
sooner or later.  Assuming such a dispute takes place in outer-space, we will need 
to think about its legal implications.  We will face difficulties relating to the choice 
of law: What law should apply?  Which legal system has jurisdiction to address the 
dispute?  If a judgment was somehow entered, how will the plaintiff enforce it in 
the defendant’s home country?  The answers to these questions are unpredictable at 
this point because there is no internationally-agreed upon structure which addresses 
these matters.  This Comment will therefore formulate a proposal which calls for 
international efforts to develop a legal structure similar to the one in place for inter-
national commercial disputes. 
Section II will primarily address the choice of law problem.  The Comment will 
first highlight different methods currently used in non-sovereign locations such as 
in Antarctica and the high seas and address whether the proposed structure should 
rely on these methods or not.  This Section will later address the different modern 
alternatives that have been developed and assess their viability.  Section III will 
delve into the different organizations and conventions that have been put in place 
since the mid-20th century to tackle space-exploration disputes.  This Section will 
underline the successes and failures of the different conventions, which will help 
develop a more efficient proposal by relying on past experiences.  Finally, Section 
IV will stress the importance of developing a structure similar to the one for inter-
national commercial disputes but with a focus on outer-space disputes.  This Section 
will emphasize the benefits of such a proposal, while explaining the benefits of an 
ADR-oriented structure vis-à-vis a litigation one.  It will also heavily rely on the 
legal benefits that the New York Convention20 and the UNCITRAL’s Model Law21 
                                                          
 20. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as 
the “New York Arbitration Convention” or the “New York Convention,” “is one of the key instruments 
in international arbitration.  N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ (last visited 
on Sept. 10, 2017). The New York Convention applies to the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards and the referral by a court to arbitration.”  Id.  It “seeks to provide common legislative 
standards for the recognition of arbitration agreements and court recognition and enforcement of foreign 
and non-domestic arbitral awards.”  United Nations Commission on Int’l Trade L., Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNITED NATIONS, 1 (1958), http://www.un-
citral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-Convention-E.pdf.  “The Convention’s 
principal aim is that foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards will not be discriminated against and it 
obliges Parties to ensure such awards are recognized and generally capable of enforcement in their ju-
risdiction in the same way as domestic awards.”  Id. “An ancillary aim of the Convention is to require 
courts of Parties to give full effect to arbitration agreements by requiring courts to deny the parties access 
to court in contravention of their agreement to refer the matter to an arbitral tribunal.” Id. 
 21. The (UNCITRAL’s) Model Law is designed to assist States in reforming and modernizing their 
laws on arbitral procedure so as to take into account the particular features and needs of international 
commercial arbitration. It covers all stages of the arbitral process from the arbitration agreement, the 
composition and jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and the extent of court intervention through to the 
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. It reflects worldwide consensus on key aspects of 
international arbitration practice having been accepted by States of all regions and the different legal or 
economic systems of the world. See generally United Nations Commission on Int’l Trade L., UNCITRAL 
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provided to international commercial disputes, and incorporate these benefits into 
the proposal. 
II.  CHOICE OF LAW: A COMPLICATED MATTER 
A.  Lack of a Uniform Choice of Law System: Examples from                   
Non-Sovereign areas 
Imagine this: 
An American biologist is conducting an experiment aboard an orbiting 
multinational space station (MSS) built by the United States, Canada, Ja-
pan, and the European Space Agency.  The biologist is passing through the 
Canadian module, where a French astrophysicist is repairing an instrument 
panel.  The astrophysicist carelessly pushes aside a wrench, which floats 
away and injures the biologist.  Which state’s choice of law rules—and 
institutions—determine which state’s substantive laws will apply to the 
issues of the astrophysicist’s liability and the American’s ability to recover 
damages22 
This fact pattern is the nightmare of any first-year Civil Procedure law student.  
Thankfully, law students do not have to provide an answer at this moment, but the 
legal profession will have to do so at some point in the near future.  The issue raised 
by the scenario above relates to the choice of law: which substantive law should 
govern in a dispute involving individuals from different countries and where the 
dispute takes place in a non-sovereign, “jurisdiction-less,” location?  Since outer-
space is deemed part of the “common heritage of humankind,”23 no state may assert 
control or exclusive dominion over any part of outer-space.24  Subsequently, when 
a dispute arises in outer-space, such as in the example above, the decision as to 
which substantive law applies is hard, if not impossible, to figure out.  It has been 
suggested that when addressing the choice of law issue, the decision-maker (i.e., 
the court or the arbitrator) should take into consideration a number of factors such 
as (1) the registry state of the MSS module at issue; (2) the nationality of the plain-
tiff; and (3) the nationality of the defendant.25  However, it is likely that the courts 
applying this test might knowingly or unconsciously favor their own laws, which 
would result in an unpredictable system.  Therefore, the inherent problem in this 
example is the lack of a uniform choice of law which would govern disputes (or 
torts in this case) aboard an MSS in outer-space.26 
                                                          
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, UNITED NATIONS (1985), http://www.newyork-
convention.org/ (amended in 2006). 
 22. Helen Shin, “Oh, I Have Slipped the Surly Bonds of Earth”: Multinational Space Stations and 
Choice of Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (1990). 
 23. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. I, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2412-13, 
610 U.N.T.S. 205, 207-08.  
 24. See, e.g., id. art. II, 18 U.S.T. at 2413, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208 (outer space “is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty”). 
 25. Shin, supra note 22, at 1378. 
 26. Id. at 1377. 
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As explained above, the choice of law problem tends to be even more confusing 
in “jurisdiction-less,” non-sovereign territories (i.e., outer-space) because of the 
lack of applicable procedural and substantive law.  The following two subsections 
will highlight how the international community addressed the choice of law prob-
lem in two non-sovereign places on Earth, and subsequently think about whether 
these examples serve as a helpful model for outer-space disputes. 
i.  Antarctica 
Antarctica is an interesting example to rely on because several states claim sov-
ereignty over different parts of this territory.27  However, the Antarctic Treaty of 
1959 froze these disputes,28 resulting in an absence of a sovereign entity imposing 
its laws on the territories of the Antarctic29—a similar situation to outer-space.  The 
lack of a sovereign legal system, however, does not mean that each country is free 
to do what it pleases.  The Antarctic Treaty imposed standards of conduct in addi-
tion to some methods of dispute resolution for activities carried on the territory.30  
In other words, the Antarctic Treaty binds signatory countries to a standard of con-
duct, and provides a framework for punishing breaching states. 
However, the focus of this Comment is on the activities of individuals and pri-
vate entities—rather than state actors—in non-sovereign territories (such as outer-
space or Antarctica in this case).  The Antarctic Treaty fails to regulate the wrong-
doings of private parties from non-signatory countries.31  It solely provides juris-
diction by a signatory state over its nationals who are performing scientific or ex-
ploratory missions.32  If a French scientist commits a tort in Antarctica, he would 
only be subject to the jurisdiction of the French courts.  A scientist from Mexico—
a non-signatory country—for example, would not necessarily be subject to the ju-
risdiction of the Mexican courts nor to any other particular court’s system and a 
question arises as to how to assert jurisdiction over her.  The Antarctic Treaty fails 
to provide a predictable and reliable legal solution to the wrongdoings of nationals 
of non-signatory states—which are numerous—and, therefore, could not serve as a 
model to be applied in outer-space disputes. 
                                                          
 27. These states include Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom. JEFFERY D. MYHRE, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM: POLITICS, LAW, AND DIPLOMACY 7 
(1986). 
 28. “Art. IV, sec. 1 of the Antarctic Treaty provides that nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as a 
renunciation by any signatory of previously asserted claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, or as 
affecting a signatory’s recognition or non-recognition of any other state’s claim to such sovereignty.” 
Shin, supra note 22, at 1379, n. 21; See Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 796, 402 U.N.T.S. 
71, 74. 
 29. Shin, supra note 22, at 1379. 
 30. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 28, arts. VI, XI, 12 U.S.T. at 797, 402 U.N.T.S. at 76. 
 31. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 28, art. VIII. 
 32. Id. 
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ii.  The High Seas 
Unlike land, the majority of the oceans and seas are not claimed (and could not 
be because of international agreements) by a state.33  The aggregate of all unclaimed 
water areas (mainly oceans) constitutes the high seas, which no state is allowed to 
claim sovereignty over.34  Despite the lack of an exclusive sovereign over the high 
seas, international law and treaties provide a legal framework for activities under-
taken on the high seas.35  However, unlike the Antarctic Treaty, the various treaties 
and agreements are equally enforceable to all states and their nationals.36  For ex-
ample, it is custom that the state under which the ship sails—also known as the flag 
state—has jurisdiction over that ship in the high seas.37  Concurrently, a flag state 
will maintain primary jurisdiction over a defendant for misconduct occurring on the 
ship while on the high seas, despite the generally accepted notion of a state main-
taining jurisdiction over its nationals who are within the jurisdiction of another 
state.38  Therefore, despite the lack of an explicit choice of law structure which dic-
tates the applicable substantive law, international agreements and customs provide 
a uniform rule from which a choice of law decision could be made.39 
An important distinction, however, could be drawn between the example of 
ships sailing in the high seas and space shuttles.  As explained above, ships sail 
under the flag of a state and therefore can easily be associated with a set of national 
substantive and procedural laws.  Since space activities require significant effort 
and financial investments, it is customary for private companies to team up with 
other companies (or even foreign State agencies).  When a space exploration mis-
sion is undertaken by an association of different private companies it becomes much 
harder for a court to figure out the applicable state law.  Subsequently, the choice 
of law method applied in the case of high seas is unlikely to be effective in outer-
space disputes. 
B.  Traditional Choice of Law Approaches on Earth 
Given that the above examples of non-sovereign areas were deemed non-help-
ful and not fully applicable for outer-space choice of law matters, we turn our at-
tention to some of the traditional choice of law methods used on Earth.  The follow-
ing subsections will address the concept of Lex Loci Delicti and the subsequent 
developments in the legal field. 
                                                          
 33. A coastal state can claim extensive (though not exclusive) jurisdictional rights in a zone up to 200 
miles from an established baseline. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 133 
(rev. ed. 1988). 
 34. Id. at 164–65. . 
 35. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1883 U.N.T.S. 397; see 
also The Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. 
 36. Shin, supra note 22, at 1381. 
 37. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 33, at 168–69.  
 38. Id. at 169. 
 39. Shin, supra note 22, at 1381-82. 
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2018, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2018/iss1/16
No. 1] Outer-Space Disputes 271 
i.  The Traditional Approach: Lex Loci Delicti 
Under the theory of Lex Loci Delicti, courts are likely to apply the substantive 
laws of the location where the wrongdoing takes place.40  Some courts will look at 
the location “where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged 
tort takes place.”41  The benefits of this approach is that it provides uniformity and 
predictability: As long as the act is committed while on a sovereign territory, the 
courts will easily be able to determine the applicable law of the jurisdiction.42  
Therefore, because of the straight-forward applicability of the jurisdiction’s laws, 
the plaintiff will have no opportunity to “shop-around” for a more favorable law.43  
Generally, most of the states with current abilities to send exploratory missions to 
outer-space—with the exception of the United States—rely on the Lex Loci Delicti 
theory.44 
Despite its benefits and long-use, Lex Loci Delicti is not necessarily the best 
approach for outer-space.  We should first keep in mind that most United States 
state courts are abandoning this approach in favor of other alternatives.45  One could 
question whether this approach will get the needed international support when the 
United States—a major player in outer-space activities—does not rely on it.  An-
other obstacle to the adoption of the theory is determining the location (and there-
fore the applicable substantive laws) for outer-space disputes.  Unlike on Earth, 
there are no sovereign territories beyond the Earth’s atmosphere.  Therefore, the 
whole purpose of the Lex Loci Delicti theory will be undermined by the lack of 
sovereign jurisdictions with applicable substantive laws.  One author has suggested, 
in reliance on maritime law, that “the registration of the space station with a state 
makes the station an actual orbiting fragment of the registry state, so that any tort is 
actually committed ‘in’ the registry state.”46  However, following the failure of such 
an argument in maritime law disputes, and the complexities explained above of pri-
vate space ventures the author acknowledges the shortcomings of the proposal.47 
The choice of law question remains unanswered at this point and must be taken 
into consideration for any future proposal addressing disputes in outer-space.  Sec-
tion II tackled the choice of law issue from a theoretical perspective by highlighting 
and explaining different methods used around the world in diverse circumstances.  
Since the mid-20th century, international actors put in place several applicable con-
ventions and different organizations with the aim of tackling outer-space activities 
in its different forms.  These efforts went beyond the jurisdictional question that 
Section II above addressed: They should be understood as an aggregate of diplo-
matic efforts by the powerful nations to regulate space activities.  Section III below 
expands on these efforts, and the resulting conventions and international organiza-
tions, as well as their contribution to the field from a practical legal perspective, in 
addition to their short-comings. 
                                                          
 40. ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 235–37 (2d ed. 1960). 
 41. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (AM. LAW. INST. 1934). 
 42. Shin, supra note 22, at 1391. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See ROGER C. CRAMTON ET. AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 226–27 
(4th ed. 1987) (as of publication date, only 15 out of 50 states apply the traditional choice of law rules). 
 46. Shin, supra note 22, at 1393. 
 47. Id. at 1393–94. 
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III.  DECADES OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS: 
SCATTERED BENEFITS AND SHORTCOMINGS 
A.  Outer-Space Treaty 
In 1967, the United Nations adopted the first international treaty relating to 
outer-space, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies—
commonly known as the outer-space treaty (“OST”).48  This treaty became known 
as the “constitution of outer-space” because of its broad scope and content.49  De-
spite it being a novelty at the time, OST was forged during an era of increased ten-
sions and therefore reflects international aspirations to de-escalate the potential con-
frontation.50  In other words, OST is a reflection of the cold-war era and mirrors the 
geopolitical interests of the two superpowers.51  Subsequently, OST underlined the 
peaceful aspect of any future explorative mission and urged states to abide by that.52  
Furthermore, the treaty maintained that the outer-space shall not be subject to the 
control of any single state,53 thus that every state has a “non-exclusive right to the 
peaceful use, study, and exploration of outer space.”54  The treaty also calls for “co-
operation and mutual assistance” between the different states (mainly the United 
States and the Soviet Union at the time) for any outer-space activity.55 
From a relevant legal perspective, the treaty addresses individual state’s liabil-
ity in case of harm.  States, in their official capacities, are held ultimately responsi-
ble for any damage caused by their activities and the activities of their nationals.56  
In addition, the treaty holds the state liable for damages caused by a space object 
which the state has either launched or assisted in its launching.57  Subsequently, the 
treaty puts the burden on the state for regulating and overseeing space ventures.58  
The treaty, despite it being the “constitution” of space activities, failed to mention 
private entities and their space ventures.  Understandably, the treaty was drafted 
during a period in which it would be hard to anticipate private space ventures.  The 
focus of the document was geared toward preventing a destructive confrontation 
rather than regulating the minute details of private space ventures. 
                                                          
 48. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 49. Brian Abrams, First Contact: Establishing Jurisdiction Over Activities in Outer Space, 42 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 797, 801–02 (2014). 
 50. Brian Beck, The Next, Small, Step for Mankind: Fixing the Inadequacies of the International Space 
Law Treaty Regime to Accommodate the Modern Space Flight Industry, 19 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 
12 (2009). 
 51. Abrams, supra note 49, at 802. 
 52. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. I. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Arbaugh, supra note 8, at 833 (citing GERARDINE MEISHAN GOH, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: A MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE FOR OUTER SPACE 140 (2007)). 
 55. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, arts. IX–XII. 
 56. Id. art. VI.   
 57. Id. art. VII. 
 58. Id. art. VI. 
8
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2018, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2018/iss1/16
No. 1] Outer-Space Disputes 273 
B.  The Liability Convention 
In 1972, the Claims Commission of the Convention on International Liability 
for Damage Caused by Space Objects—also known as the Liability Convention—
was entered into force.59  It was enacted to clarify and supplement the outer-space 
treaty.60  While the treaty imposed liability on states for their outer-space activities, 
the liability convention set the standard for the liability.61  Interestingly, the Liabil-
ity Convention went into more details than the OST, such as distinguishing between 
harm caused in outer-space and the one caused by space objects on the surface of 
the earth or in the air.62  Article II of the liability convention sets out the following: 
“A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage 
caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight.”63  Ar-
ticle II imposes a strict liability standard to any harm caused on the surface of the 
earth or in the air by space objects launched by a state.  Such a standard is different 
than the “negligence” one stated by article III for harm caused in outer-space.64  In 
either case, the Liability Convention imposes liability solely on the states, and not 
on individual actors or private companies.65  So once again, as with the OST, the 
Liability Convention fails to cover wrongdoings committed by the future main ac-
tors of outer-space activities. 
On a positive note, however, the Liability Convention moves one step ahead 
by laying out a dispute resolution process, in case of a space object-related dispute 
(either in outer space, in the air, or on the surface of the earth).  It sets out a two-tier 
process for settling disputes between states.66  The process encourages diplomatic 
efforts to solve the dispute; therefore the use of bilateral (or multilateral, in case 
more parties are involved) diplomatic channels to settle the dispute peacefully.67  
Only when diplomacy fails after one year of good faith efforts, is a state allowed to 
bring a claim under the Liability Convention.68  This second option involves the 
setting of a Claims Commission—an ad hoc type of a commission—to solve the 
matter.69  The commission is similar to an arbitration tribunal: It consists of three 
members, one chosen by each side and a third whom both parties agree on.70  The 
commission will make its decision after evaluating the merits, and has the authority 
to award a monetary compensation.71  The commission’s award is binding only if 
the parties agree to that, in writing, beforehand.72 
                                                          
 59. Arbaugh, supra note 8, at 833–34. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Abrams, supra note 49, at 805. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, art. II, Mar. 29, 1972, 
24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 10 I.L.M. 965 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
 64. See generally id. (“In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth 
to a space object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such a space object by a space 
object of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the 
fault of persons for whom it is responsible.”) 
 65. Abrams, supra note 49, at 805; see also Liability Convention, supra note 63, art. II & III. 
 66. Abrams, supra note 49, at 806. 
 67. Liability Convention, supra note 63, art. IX. 
 68. Id. art. XIV.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. art. XV.  
 71. Id. art. XVIII.   
 72. Id. art. XIX.  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It is important to note that the Liability Convention does not impose exclusive 
means to seek redress: Parties are free to seek a remedy through other means, but 
are prevented from seeking the same remedy through different means at the same 
time—such as bringing a claim in the national courts of the state while having a 
pending claim with the commission.73  Despite the author’s appreciation of the ef-
forts of the Liability Convention to lay out a dispute resolution process, one could 
question its viability from a practical standpoint and could question whether a state 
would be willing to bind itself to a decision of a commission over which it has no 
control.  After all, the Liability Convention has never been called on, so far, and we 
cannot predict its efficiency at this point.74 
C.  The International Court of Justice 
One recurrent suggestion for addressing outer-space disputes has been to in-
volve the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the ADR process.  Particularly, 
the suggestion is for the establishment of a chamber within the ICJ for outer-space 
disputes, similar to the chamber created back in 1993 for environmental matters.75  
Even though the idea of using the ICJ for particularly narrow matters is not new,76 
the idea got some support among space lawyers.77  This idea sounds interesting 
because it gives the parties the chance to solve their dispute in front of a specialized 
chamber, while keeping the door open to transfer the case to the full court, if 
needed.78  The environmental chamber of the ICJ has, so far, proven to be unpopu-
lar.79  The chamber has not heard a case because no state filed a claim there.80  A 
number of reasons exist as to why the environmental chamber has been rather un-
successful in carrying out its job.  A relevant reason, for instance, is the lack of a 
uniform, internationally agreed-upon environmental law under which the parties 
could bring their claims.81  For example, in a case involving both Hungary and Slo-
vakia, the former relied on the principles of international environmental law while 
the latter focused on the law of treaties.82  Similar to environmental matters, there 
is a lack of uniformity of space law at the international level.  In this sense, even if 
a space chamber was initiated, we could expect some cumbersome procedural con-
flicts; let alone the parties’ willingness to bring their disputes there because of a 
                                                          
 73. Liability Convention, supra note 63, art. XI. 
 74. Michael Listner, A New Paradigm for Arbitrating Disputes in Outer Space, THE SPACE REVIEW 
(Jan. 9, 2012), http://www. thespacereview.com/article/2002/1. 
 75. The ICJ established a special seven-member Chamber of the Court for Environmental Matters in 
1993. See Chambers and Committees, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/en/chambers-and-committees. 
 76. Sylvia-Maureen Williams, Dispute Settlement and Space Activities: A New Framework Re-
quired?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 39TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 61, 64 (1996).   
 77. Michael Byers et. al., Report of the Sixty-Eighth Conference, 1998 The Int’l L. Ass’n 247, 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.ilarc/ ilarc1998&div=1&id=&page=&collection=ilarc.   
 78. Revised Rules of Court, 1945 I.C.J Acts & Docs 
 79. Lotta Viikarri, Towards More Effective Settlement of Disputes in the Space Sector, 1 LAPLAND L. 
REV. 226, 241 (2011). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See generally Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep 
7, (Sept. 25). 
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lack of currently agreed-upon international agreements that would allow parties to 
effectively solve their dispute.83 
The viability of a space chamber as part of the ICJ is, therefore, subject to future 
experiences despite it being an unlikely first choice.  Away from courts and litiga-
tion, some scholars have suggested arbitration as a method to solve outer-space dis-
putes.  Section IV below will go into further detail about the need to create an in-
ternationally agreed upon structure to resolve any future space-related disputes.  
Furthermore, the Comment will address whether litigation or alternative dispute 
resolution methods (mainly arbitration) would better serve the needs of space dis-
putes. Ultimately, we will elaborate on the proposal of this Comment on the need 
to rely on past experiences in different legal fields to come up with an adequate way 
to address space-related disputes. 
IV.  TOWARD A UNIFORM ARBITRAL INSTITUTION 
As explained in the introduction, the goal of this Comment is to develop a pro-
posal for the creation of a firm structure for addressing outer-space disputes.  A 
number of questions arise: Why do we need an internationally agreed-upon dispute 
resolution method?  What are the benefits of developing such a structure?  Should 
it involve litigation, or should we think about alternative dispute resolution meth-
ods; and if so, which one?  The proposed structure in this Comment is one that 
heavily relies on a binding arbitration process, very similar in form to the one used 
for international commercial disputes.  Section IV will address the questions raised 
above and elaborate on the proposed structure. 
A.  The Need and Benefits of an Arbitral Institution 
A significant existing arbitral institution is the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA). Established in 1899, the PCA was the very first permanent inter-govern-
mental institution to provide a number of ADR services.84  Despite it being initially 
established for political reasons, including the objective of limiting the increased 
armament in Europe,85 the PCA quickly evolved into an international institution, 
strategically located in the Hague, Netherlands,86 “perfectly situated at the juncture 
between public and private international law to meet the rapidly evolving dispute 
resolution needs of the international community.”87  With more than 120 member 
states,88 the PCA is not, despite its name, a court in the traditional sense but rather 
a permanent framework for resolving disputes.89 
In 2009, the PCA realized the existing gaps in the current system and felt the 
need to address the development of an effective alternative dispute system for 
                                                          
 83. Viikarri, supra note 79, at 241. 
 84. History, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduc-
tion/history/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
 85. Id. 
 86. About, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/ (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2017). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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space-related disputes.90  The Administrative Council of the PCA has called for the 
creation of an Advisory Group of legal experts91 who were tasked with considering 
the “desirability of, or need for, arbitration rules specifically targeted at the resolu-
tion of space-related disputes.”92  After an extensive study, the Advisory Group 
reached its conclusion, making three relevant points.93  It found that (1) there is a 
need for an international forum to address outer-space disputes, and the forum 
should be equally applicable to both state and non-state actors;94  (2) the scope of 
activity of this forum should be broad enough to address all space-related disputes 
rather than those covered by the narrow treaties in place;95  and (3) despite the ex-
istence of other dispute resolution alternatives for private parties, a space-focused 
mechanism is worthwhile.96  The Advisory Group concluded that establishing an 
international arbitral forum, specifically geared toward outer-space disputes, would 
be the most advantageous way to proceed forward.97 
Developing a new ADR-oriented forum to address outer-space disputes pro-
vides a number of benefits.  Space activities require cooperation between the dif-
ferent international players.98  If a superior dispute resolution system—different 
from the confrontational aspect of litigation—is created, it will result in a better, 
more cooperative, and less hostile environment.99  Such an environment could allow 
for better relief subsequent to a dispute—such as help in cleaning disasters—which 
will trigger a series of positive reactions (due to the parties understanding that the 
benefits of entering into the venture overcomes the costs of solving a potential dis-
pute) between both private and public actors, reflecting the initial aspirations of a 
peaceful, cooperative space exploration program.100 
Another major benefit relates to the choice of law problem addressed above.  
ADR procedures could allow parties to negotiate the applicable substantive and 
procedural law, or in case they fail to reach an agreement, the panel could instead 
make the choice of law decision.101  Granted, the panel’s role in deciding the appli-
cable law is very similar to a national court’s role in making that decision, however, 
the panel would be relying on internationally-agreed upon set of rules rather than 
the national laws of individual countries, resulting in much more predictability of 
                                                          
 90. Fausto Pocar, An Introduction to the PCA’s Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating 
to Outer Space Activities, 38 J. SPACE L. 171, 172 (2012). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 173. 
 93. Arbaugh, supra note 8, at 837. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 837–838 
 97. Pocar, supra note 90, at 177. 
 98. See generally Phillip D. Bostwick, Going Private with the Judicial System: Making Creative Use 
of ADR Procedures to Resolve Commercial Space Disputes, 23 J. SPACE L. 19 (1995) (discussing how 
creative uses of mediation and arbitration may prove beneficial to both sides of a dispute in private 
commercial businesses in the space industry). 
 99. Wong, supra note 12, at 465. 
 100. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. I (“The exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of 
all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province 
of all mankind.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Shin, supra note 22, at 1412 (arguing for the benefits of arbitration procedures, which 
are more flexible than judicial proceedings). 
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outcome.102  A more predictable and friendly environment will encourage and at-
tract increasing investments by private parties, which will lead to more research and 
scientific advancements in outer-space activities.103 
Unlike litigation or the current treaties or conventions addressed above, a po-
tential ADR structure could apply to all major outer-space actors, such as states, 
private entities, and intergovernmental agencies.104  Furthermore, an “isolated,” 
well-structured, and predictable ADR process tends to be a more attractive option 
to states, vis-à-vis submitting themselves to a binding multilateral treaty which re-
quires all disputes to be solved by the ICJ or some other court system.105  An arbitral 
structure would also allow for a speedy and final decision with a narrow possibility 
of appeals.106  Given that timing plays an important role in space activities—such 
as time window for landing or atmospheric re-entry—a speedy and final decision is 
well-received and beneficial in these circumstances.107  Arbitrating parties will get 
to pick expert decision-makers (the arbitrators) who can better understand space 
matters, in contrast to a local judge who, despite her legal expertise, might lack the 
technical and scientific knowledge about space activities.108  Additionally, any ADR 
process—including arbitration—protects the confidentiality of information ex-
changed, unlike open court sessions.109  In the current circumstances, the relevant 
information might involve matters of national security or scientific breakthrough 
which should obviously be protected, and arbitration provides the best venue for 
doing so.110 
B.  An UNICTRAL-Like Arbitral Structure for Outer-Space Disputes 
As mentioned in the introduction, this author believes in the efficacy of the 
well-known arbitral system put in place to address transnational commercial dis-
putes and consequently believes on relying on past experiences in the commercial 
sphere when formulating an ADR structure for outer-space activities.  In order to 
better understand the following discussion, a brief overview of the current arbitral 
legal regime follows.  The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards (also known as the “New York Convention” or the “Conven-
tion”), signed in 1958, is the foundational international legal agreement for the en-
forcement of foreign arbitral awards.111  The Convention is considered as one of the 
                                                          
 102. See generally Marc S. Firestone, Problems in the Resolution of Disputes Concerning Damage 
Caused in Outer Space, 59 TUL. L. REV. 747 (1984) (discussing the need to develop a rational and uni-
form law for outer space by international organizations). 
 103. Wong, supra note 12, at 463. 
 104. Arbaugh, supra note 8, at 842. 
 105. FABIO TRONCHETTI, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPACE LAW AND POLICY 55 (Joseph N. Pelton ed., 
2013). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Arbaugh, supra note 8, at 843. 
 108. Id. at 844. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Pocar, supra note 90, at 179. 
 111. See generally N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, supra note 20. 
13
Khoukaz: ADR That is Out of This World: A Regime for the Resolution of Out
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
278 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2018 
most successful multilateral agreements ever signed,112 with more than 150 signa-
tory countries.113  Briefly stated, the Convention requires signatory states to enforce 
an arbitral award made in another signatory country,114 so long as none of the ex-
ceptions applies.115  The grounds for refusing enforcement are mainly, but not en-
tirely, procedural in nature, and aim to guarantee a fair arbitral process.116 
Complementary to the New York Convention, two other relevant legal docu-
ments deserve to be addressed.  The UN Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) adopted the first final version of the Arbitration Rules in 1976.117  
They consist of a comprehensive set of procedural rules which parties can rely on 
or even adopt for the conduct of an arbitral procedure arising out of commercial 
disputes.118  Since its adoption, the UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules have been widely 
used by both institutional and ad hoc arbitration procedures; and have been revised 
in 2010 so that it reflects the needs and expectations of our times.119  Later on, in 
1985, the UNICTRAL adopted what became known as the proposed Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (The Model Law).120  The Model Law aims 
to harmonize the national arbitration laws of individual states in order to increase 
uniformity across states.121  The Model Law covers all stages of an arbitral proce-
dure, all the way from the initiation of an arbitration and the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal, to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award.122  The 
Model Law has also been a success, reflecting worldwide consensus on key aspects 
of international arbitral procedures, as adopted in different regions around the 
globe.123 
This author recommends that any future space-oriented ADR structure heavily 
rely on previous experiences in the commercial sphere, while incorporating the 
needs of the outer-space community.  In fact, an interesting proposal would be to 
develop a hybrid system, which relies on both the Liability Convention and the 
UNCITRAL Rules both addressed above.  The international enforceability of arbi-
tral awards—by the signatory countries of the New York Convention—provides an 
excellent guarantee that arbitration awards will be respected.  However, the major 
distinction between the commercial sphere and the outer-space one is, in this au-
thor’s view, the contractual aspect of the relation between the disputants.  When 
there is a commercial transaction, the partners will enter into a contract before (or 
while) performing their commercial duties.  In this sense, commercial partners will 
                                                          
 112. Joseph E. Neuhaus, Current Issues in the Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards, 36 U.  
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 23, 24 (2004). 
 113. Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
 114. United Nations, The New York Convention, art. III. (1958), http://www.newyorkconven-
tion.org/11165/web/files/original/1/5/15432.pdf 
 115. Id., art. V, § 1-2. 
 116. Neuhaus, supra note 112, at 25. 
 117. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.html (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2017). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See generally United Nations Commission on Int’l Trade L., supra note 21. 
 121. Saturnino E. Lucio, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 17 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 313, 313 (1986). 
 122. See generally United Nations Commission on Int’l Trade L., supra note 21. 
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have an opportunity to agree to a dispute resolution procedure before, and in antic-
ipation, of any possible future dispute.  Subsequently, the act of agreeing to a bind-
ing arbitration procedure under the New York Convention happens at a pre-dispute 
stage.  The sequence of events in the outer-space scenario is drastically different in 
most cases: Because of the different types of disputes that may arise in the outer-
space case (i.e., torts claims or property damages) parties are hardly able to agree 
to submit themselves to arbitration before any dispute arises.  It is virtually impos-
sible for a private company to enter into an arbitration agreement with every single 
potential future plaintiff, simply because it is hard, or even impossible, to anticipate 
who might be harmed by the companies’ actions. 
Therefore, based on this author’s personal reasoning, the first step would be to 
formulate an international agreement (probably in the form of a UN-sponsored Con-
vention) where any entity harmed by a foreign party (both States and private actors), 
in the course of carrying an outer-space activity, would resolve its dispute through 
an arbitration process.  The award of the arbitral tribunal will later be enforced in 
most countries, pursuant to the New York Convention.124  Currently, there is no 
internationally-agreed upon framework which forces claimants to submit them-
selves to arbitration;125 rather, they are allowed to pursue whatever course they 
wish, causing some unpredictability and a lack of uniformity.  Once this first step 
is met, the remaining steps to undertake will be a matter of procedure and brain-
storm in terms of tailoring an effective dispute resolution procedure. 
C.  A Hybrid, Space-Oriented, New ADR Structure 
The proposal, which is a lenient and flexible one involves a hybrid system 
bringing aspects from both the Liability Convention and the Model Law.  In fact, 
some authors have suggested a tiered process which involves diplomacy, mediation, 
and arbitration.126  Since outer-space disputes may involve State agencies, a volun-
tary diplomatic effort to solve the dispute might be suggested as a first step.127  How-
ever, a complication arises when a private entity and a state agency are involved in 
the dispute: Formal diplomatic channels are non-existent in this case.  In such a 
scenario, the parties could still agree to mediate the dispute in good faith.  If, within 
a certain period of time, diplomatic efforts (or mediation) fail, then any party could 
move to request an arbitral tribunal to solve the dispute.  Once a request for arbitra-
tion has been made, the subsequent arbitration procedural matters could mirror the 
UNCITRAL’s Arbitral Rules discussed above.128  For example, the procedural mat-
ters would involve deciding the number of arbitrators; the location of the arbitration 
proceeding; the applicable law; and many other details. 
A final, significant point to address relates to the tricky choice of law problem 
addressed above in Section II.  It has been suggested that the parties should be free 
to agree on the applicable substantive law during the arbitration proceeding.129  
                                                          
 124. See generally N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, supra note 20. 
 125. As discussed above in Section III, the Liability Convention is binding upon the parties only if they 
agree to submit themselves to it, after a dispute arises. See Liability Convention, supra note 62, art. XIX. 
 126. Wong, supra note 12, at 469. 
 127. Wong suggests that parties can agree to either negotiate or mediate the dispute, which would both 
be categorized as falling under “diplomatic relations.” See id. 
 128. See generally, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 117. 
 129. Wong, supra note 12, at 470. 
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Such a proposal makes sense in the transnational commercial sphere where parties 
would contract about the applicable substantive law before a dispute arises.  It is 
unlikely parties would reach an agreement post-dispute, as is the case in the outer-
space scenario.  The alternative to this problem is either for the arbitral tribunal to 
decide the substantive law based on a clear set of factors, or for the international 
community to develop a new set of substantive laws relating to potential disputes 
in outer-space.  In either case, current laws need to be modified and tailored in such 
a way as to fit outer-space disputes.         
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Comment has hopefully served to highlight the need to put more efforts 
into outer-space-related disputes, and the viable methods to resolve these disputes 
in a predictable, well structured, manner.  Section I briefly addressed the historical 
development of space exploration; it also compared the military aspect versus the 
civilian one for these activities, while emphasizing our focus on the privately ori-
ented, civilian, type.  Section II expanded on a very essential legal question that still 
needs to be answered by the legal community before proceeding forward in any 
space-related ADR structure.  Section II also provided some comparison with other 
non-sovereign territories and international waters, in order to better highlight and 
explain the issue at hand.  Section III elaborated on the different conventions and 
treaties currently in place.  The goal of section III was to inform the reader about 
the efforts put so far in addressing outer-space activities, while explaining their ben-
efits and drawbacks.  By clearly showing the lack of any effective international 
agreement for the resolution of outer-space disputes, Section III led the way into 
the need to develop a new ADR-oriented space structure.  Section IV aimed to bring 
together different relevant and effective legal concepts, from different fields of law, 
in order to make a final proposal.  It is very clear at this point that gigantic efforts 
still need to be made in order to come up with an effective end-result.  The road to 
this end-result is a lengthy and arduous one, however, the earlier the international 
community begins its work, the better it is for our societies.  Science is moving 
forward so quickly that, if we do not start thinking about these topics, technological 
developments will outpace the evolution of the law. 
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